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From Parent to Child
Intergenerational Relations 
and Intrahousehold Allocations
Jere R. Behrman 
University of Pennsylvania
Perceptions are widespread that in the United States there has been 
increasing inequality and persistent, or perhaps increasing, poverty in 
recent years. The family is viewed as critical in the determination of 
individuals' income generation capacities, particularly through human 
resource investments in schooling, but also through the home environ 
ment and other channels. In this chapter, I address two sets of questions 
that are related to these perceptions.
First, what is the extent of intergenerational mobility? How associ 
ated across generations is income? There have long been different 
views on the answers to these questions. On the one hand, there are 
perceptions of many observers dating at least back to de Tocqueville 
that the United States is an open society in which mobility is relatively 
great, with reinforcement by the Horatio Alger stories of advancement 
from the mailroom to the board room and many anecdotes about "rags 
to riches" in one generation (and sometimes back to rags in another). 
On the other hand, there are allegations that often children are "chips 
off the old block," "biology is destiny," and "the acorn falls close to the 
trunk." There is an intergenerational transfer of economic status, with 
poor parents having poor children, while the children of the rich are 
born "with a silver spoon in their mouths," and according to Herrnstein 
and Murray in The Bell Curve (1994), the heritability of intelligence 
and perhaps other traits further limits intergenerational mobility.
Second, what is the nature of intrafamily allocations, particularly of 
schooling, among children? Are such allocations in response to genetic 
endowments? Do they tend to reinforce those endowments so that bet 
ter-endowed children receive more, thus increasing earnings inequal 
ity? Or do they compensate for such endowments? If schooling 
allocations reinforce such endowments, do financial transfers from par 
ents to children compensate for the earnings differentials? In making
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these allocations do parents weigh all children equally, or do they pre 
fer some children identified, perhaps, by gender or birth order?
The objective of this chapter is to consider some elements of how 
social scientists describe and analyze phenomena related to these two 
sets of questions. A central point is that it is difficult to identify causal 
ity from associations in data that reflect behavioral choices made in 
part in response to factors that are not observed in the data by analysts. 
A key example is provided by child genetic endowments related to 
such attributes as ability, personality, persistence, and motivation. If 
parents make allocations of schooling in part in response to such 
endowments and these endowments also have direct effects on earn 
ings, then the association between schooling and earnings does not 
reflect simply the impact of schooling on earnings, but also the effects 
of the unobserved endowments on earnings to the extent that they are 
correlated with schooling. Our grandmothers know that Mary did well 
in school because she was smart and diligent, and that these character 
istics—in addition to schooling—served her well in the job market. 
Therefore, to estimate the impact of schooling per se on Mary's earn 
ings there would have to be control for her smartness and diligence, 
control that simple associations do not provide.
Describing Intergenerational Associations
How strong are intergenerational associations? As noted, popular 
characterizations range considerably, from very low ones implied by 
Horatio Alger stories and other "rages to riches" fables, to very high 
ones implied by the "intergenerational culture of poverty" and The Bell 
Curve characterizations. Two major means of describing such associa 
tions are through correlation coefficients and through heritability esti 
mates.
Intergenerational correlation exists when some characteristic of the 
parents is a determinant of that characteristic for their children. For 
instance, it could be that the income of a child is dependent on that of 
its parents. If so, a person's economic status is not entirely the product 
of his or her abilities and choices; those of his parents also impact on 
the child's income. If a positive relationship between the incomes of
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parents and children exists, then the children of low-income parents 
would, on average, be poorer than the children of high-income parents. 
But while such a relationship may inhibit social mobility, it does not 
imply a class society, or that economic status will be passed on from 
generation to generation.
To illustrate, suppose that the line labeled T in figure 1, the 45° line, 
shows the relationship between the income of parents and children, 
ceteris paribus. Then there is absolutely no social mobility. The chil 
dren's income will always equal the parents' income. On the other 
hand, suppose the T' line indicates how a child's income changes as 
the income of the parents changes. In this case, though the children of 
high/low income parents tend to have high/low incomes, over succes 
sive generations a family's income converges to Y. In this society, there 
is regression toward the mean. However, this process may not be par 
ticularly rapid. For example, if Y is $40,000 and the slope of T' is 0.8, 
it takes eight generations for a family's income to increase from 
$10,000 to $34,500.
Figure 1. Parental-Child Income Positively Correlated
Child Income T 1
Parental Income
What is the evidence regarding the extent of intergenerational par 
ent-child income correlations in the United States? There are relatively 
few estimates because not many data sets have information on the 
incomes of two generations (see estimates and surveys in Becker and
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Tomes 1986 and Behrman and Taubman 1985). Until recently, the 
available studies were all based on one year of data. These studies indi 
cated a correlation of about 0.2, that for every additional dollar of 
parental income, child income tended to increase by about 20 cents. 
This suggests a positive association between parental and family 
income, but not an overwhelming one. Such estimates suggest consid 
erable intergenerational mobility, with many Horatio Algers and 
reverse Horatio Algers.
One problem with these estimates, however, is that one year of 
reported income data may not represent very well income over longer 
periods of time. There may be reporting errors as well as fluctuations in 
incomes from year to year because of fluctuations in the economy, the 
luck of individuals, or choices that people make that affect their 
incomes. Such fluctuations mean that estimates based on one year are 
likely to understate the extent of the intergenerational income associa 
tions over longer periods. It would seem then that the associations over 
periods longer than a year are what is of interest in describing intergen 
erational mobility. The question of primary interest is whether children 
who have relatively high-income parents during the children's child 
hood years are likely to have relatively high income themselves over 
their adult years, not for any particular year.
Recently data sets have been available in which income information 
on parents and on their adult children has been collected for a number 
of years. These data permit the exploration of the possibility that previ 
ous studies overestimated intergenerational mobility because they used 
only one year of income data. Estimates made from these data find that 
using up to ten years of income data makes a considerable difference in 
the estimated intergenerational correlation, and in fact, cause it to 
roughly double to about 0.4, with the implication that for every addi 
tional dollar of parental income child income is about 40 cents higher 
(Behrman and Taubman 1990; Solon 1992; Zimmermann 1992). Thus, 
controlling for something as simple as the fluctuations in income from 
year to year makes a considerable difference in the estimates of inter 
generational mobility and leads to estimates of considerably less 
mobility and considerably stronger familial associations.
Heritability estimates indicate the proportion of the total variance in 
some observed outcome (phenotype) such as income that is associated 
with the variance in genetic endowments (genotype). Standard esti-
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mates assume that the phenotype is related to the genotype and to other 
determinants in a simple linear relation in which the genetic effects and 
the other relevant factors each can be summarized in one indicator, 
with no interaction between them. Such estimates are common in the 
literature that attempts to identify the importance of "nature" (genetic 
endowments) versus "nurture" (other influences on the phenotype, 
including behavioral choices such as schooling investments). Heritabil- 
ity estimates can range in value from 0 to 1, with the variance in geno 
type a larger share of the variance in phenotype the higher the estimate.
Heritability estimates usually are obtained from data on phenotype 
of twins by using the fact that identical twins have identical genetic 
endowments but fraternal twins have differing genetic endowments. 
Therefore, if genetic endowments are important, phenotypes are more 
similar for identical twins than for fraternal twins. For example, for the 
National Academy of Science-National Research Council sample of 
white male twins born in the United States between 1917 and 1927 
who subsequently served in the military, the correlation in earnings is 
0.56 for identical twins and 0.32 for fraternal twins, which implies a 
heritability estimate of 0.48.' That is, the ratio of the variation in earn 
ings due to variations in genotypes is about half of the total variation in 
earnings. In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) claim that 
most measures of heritability for IQ in the United States recently tend 
to be in the range of 0.4 to 0.8. Estimates of these magnitudes often 
have been interpreted to mean that nature (genotypes) is quite impor 
tant, leaving little scope for the impact of nurture through, for example, 
schooling. Herrnstein and Murray give such an interpretation.
But changes in nurture may have large impacts even if heritability 
estimates are high. Consider, for illustration, the situation in which 
there are only two genotypes (G] and G2), each of which accounts for 
half of the population. Both phenotypes respond to "nurture" as in fig 
ure 2. In this figure, income is measured on the vertical axis and nur 
ture is measured on the horizontal axis. Both genotypes respond 
positively to nurture, so the income lines for each of the genotypes is 
upward-sloping. But genotype 2 is assumed to have greater genetic 
endowments, so the line for this genotype is higher than for genotype 
1. Assume further that half of the members of each genotype are 
exposed to nurture level 1 and half are exposed to nurture level 2. 
Therefore, one quarter of the population will have the income-geno-
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type-nurture combinations indicated by each of the points marked a, b, 
c, and d. Then, as figure 2 is drawn, the heritability estimate will be 
high. Most of the observed variation in income is due to the difference 
between the two genotypes.
Figure 2. High Heritability But Still Large Impact of Changing 
"Nurture"
Phenotype 
(Income)
Nurture
But this does not mean that nurture has no effect. To the contrary, 
increasing nurture—say, by increasing schooling—has a positive effect 
on income. The high value of heritability only reflects the relatively 
small difference between nurture levels 1 and 2. Indeed, the heritability 
estimate would be much smaller if the same two genotypes were 
divided equally between nurture levels 1 and 3 instead of between 1 
and 2. The basic point is that to evaluate the impact of nurture through 
schools or other means, the slopes of the lines are what are of interest. 
This impact may be large whether the heritability estimate is large or 
small. The small estimate for heritability does not tell us what would 
happen if nurture were to be changed. But often the literature on 
"nature versus nurture" is not clear on this critical point. For example, 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) suggest that because heritability esti-
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mates are high, schooling and other forms of nurture are not very effec 
tive. As is illustrated in figure 2, this is not a logical deduction.
What Underlies Family Allocations among Children?
The descriptions provided by correlations and heritability estimates 
summarized earlier are consistent with families being important in 
determining children's economic experiences as adults. This raises 
questions about how families allocate resources among children. For 
example, do families allocate human resources, such as schooling, in 
response to children's genetic endowments? Do they allocate resources 
so as to reinforce or to compensate for differences in genetic endow 
ments? Do they have greater concern about some children—say, identi 
fied by sex or birth order—than others?
Economists have developed different models of intrahousehold allo 
cations that provide a framework for thinking about such questions. 
Such frameworks are useful because it is difficult to analyze these (and 
other) behaviors that in part are in response to variables not observable 
by social scientists but that affect the decisions being made—in this 
case, genetic endowments of children. Because of such unobservable 
variables, one cannot simply look at associations (correlations) among 
observed variables in order to answer questions such as those posed 
above. I consider two models of intrahousehold allocations below in 
which parents make the decisions regarding allocations of human 
resources among their children. 2 Before turning to these models, how 
ever, I introduce some basic elements common to the models.
In these models, parents are assumed to maximize their satisfaction 
by deciding how much to invest in the schooling of each of their chil 
dren. Parents are interested in their own consumption, but in order to 
sharpen considerations about how they allocate resources among their 
children, I assume that the allocation of resources among the children 
is separable from the parents' decision about how they themselves con 
sume. I also assume that the parents' satisfaction increases as any 
child's income rises, ceteris paribus.
As in any economic model of household choice, the incomes that 
parents "choose" for their children depend on the exact nature of
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parental preferences and a budget constraint—in this case, the income 
possibilities frontier, those combinations of incomes that are attainable 
by the children. The income possibilities frontier would presumably 
have the appearance of the textbook production possibilities frontier; 
its precise curvature and position would depend on the endowments of 
each child, the resources that the parents devote to their children, the 
prices of schooling, and so forth.
Figure 3 shows how the parents' preferences and the income possi 
bilities frontier interact to determine each child's income. Two charac 
teristics of equal-satisfaction curves are of interest. First, there is the 
"distribution-total income" tradeoff, which relates to the curvature of 
the equal-satisfaction curves. If equal-satisfaction curves are straight 
lines, parents are only concerned with the total income of their chil 
dren. The distribution of this income among the children is unimpor 
tant to the parents. In contrast, if these curves are rectangular (L- 
shaped), parental satisfaction increases only if the incomes of both 
children increase. In this case, the primary concern is with how income 
is distributed between children. If these curves have the textbook cur 
vature of indifference curves, both total income and its distribution are 
of concern to parents.
Figure 3. Constrained Maximization of Parental Satisfaction Regarding 
Child Income
Income
of 
Child 1
Income Possibilities 
I Frontier
Income of Child 2
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A second characteristic of these curves that merits attention is their 
symmetry, or lack thereof. These curves are symmetric if switching the 
incomes of two children has no effect on the satisfaction of their par 
ents. If equal-satisfaction curves do not have this property, parents care 
which child receives the higher income when some total income is dis 
tributed between the two children. If equal-satisfaction curves are sym 
metric and children have equal endowments, parents will invest in the 
education of their children and make financial transfer so as to produce 
equal incomes for their children. However, if either of these conditions 
do not hold, income equality will not necessarily obtain.
Currently, the wealth model (Becker and Tomes 1976) is the para 
digm that economists most commonly use to analyze intrafamily allo 
cation of resources. In the wealth model, parents are concerned only 
with the total wealth of each child, not with its composition of sources. 
Therefore, they do not distinguish between earned income and 
unearned income. If parents both invest in the schooling of their chil 
dren and transfer financial and physical assets to their children, they do 
so in order to maximize the total wealth of the children. This of course 
requires that parents increase their investment in the education of a 
child as long as the marginal rate of return to that investment exceeds 
the rate of return on financial assets.
In the wealth model, as originally presented by Becker and Tomes, it 
is assumed that parents provide enough resources to their children that 
all children receive financial transfers in addition to wealth-maximiz 
ing investments in schooling. Parents invest in the human capital of 
each child until the marginal rate of return to education is driven down 
to the rate of return on financial assets; any additional resources pro 
vided to children take the form of transfers such as gifts and bequests. 
Parents with more than one child and equal concern for all their chil 
dren (symmetric equal-satisfaction curves) use transfers to offset fully 
inequalities in their children's earnings. Hence, the wealth model with 
equal concern predicts a pattern of unequal earnings, unequal transfers, 
and equal wealth. But parents' investments in their children's human 
capital are socially efficient provided there are no externalities and 
well-functioning capital markets.
However, the assumption that parents are rich enough and altruistic 
enough that they provide all of their children the wealth-maximizing 
level of schooling is critical (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1995). If
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parents do not allocate "enough" resources to their children, then some 
children receive less than the socially efficient level of human capital, 
and those children receive zero transfer. In this case, (a) schooling 
investments are not efficient, and (b) even if parents have equal con 
cern, the incomes of the children are not equalized because the child 
with greater endowments receives greater schooling investments and 
earns greater income, but transfers are not used to equalize total 
income between the children.
In contrast to Becker and Tomes, the separable earnings transfer 
(SET) model of Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) assumes that 
parents care differently about income that their children earn from 
working than about income their children receive from clipping bond 
coupons. So, they consider the distribution of earnings among their 
children separably from the distribution of nonearnings income.
The SET model has two important different implications from those 
of the wealth model with substantial resources devoted to children as 
originally presented by Becker and Tomes. First, the SET model does 
not imply that human capital investments are efficient, even with well- 
functioning capital markets and no externalities. If parents value earn 
ings income more than nonearnings income, for example, they may 
invest more in the schooling of a child than wealth-maximizing. Sec 
ond, it does not imply that parents with equal concern for their children 
attempt to offset fully differences in earnings by allocating transfers 
unequally. The consideration of earnings separably from transfers in 
fact means that there is no relation between earnings gaps between sib 
lings and patterns of transfers received from parents. Therefore, rather 
than equal income among children in the same family with different 
endowments, the SET model generally implies unequal income. While 
these are important differences in comparison with the Becker and 
Tomes original formulation of the wealth model, the wealth model 
implications when parents do not devote enough resources to their chil 
dren to provide positive transfers to each are similar (though not identi 
cal since the SET model results are consistent with positive transfers).
Data limitations make it difficult to estimate critical parameters of 
either of these models directly or to distinguish empirically between 
the wealth model and the SET model. Some critical variables simply 
are not observable in any data set, namely endowments and marginal 
rates of return to schooling for individuals. Other data are only par-
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tially observed. For example, to assess these models it would be desir 
able to have lifetime transfers (inter vivos and bequests) received by all 
children in a family from their parents and lifetime schooling invest 
ments and earnings. But at best data sets provide a subset of this infor 
mation. Nevertheless, by using special data on adult siblings and in 
some cases specific assumptions about the underlying relations, some 
progress has been made in estimating critical dimensions of these 
intrahousehold allocation models. I discuss three examples.
First, conditional on particular functional forms for parental levels 
of satisfaction and for the impact of genetic endowments and schooling 
on earnings, estimates of the SET model provide insight into the total 
income-distribution tradeoff and unequal concern in the parental objec 
tive function underlying intrahousehold allocations (Behrman, Pollak 
and Taubman 1982, 1986; Behrman and Taubman 1986; Behrman 
1988a, 1988b). For the United States, these estimates indicate that 
investments in schooling are not determined solely by concerns about 
maximizing total income of the children: distribution also weighs 
heavily in intrafamily allocations. For rural India, a much poorer soci 
ety, similar results have been found for the allocation of nutrients 
among children during the surplus season when food is relatively abun 
dant, but during the lean season when food is scarce, allocation is 
determined almost entirely by productivity concerns.
Parents might provide unequal education to daughters and sons 
because their preferences favor children of one gender or because they 
know that the labor market rewards unequally women and men with 
the same ability and the same human capital. Estimates of the SET 
model show that the preferences of parents in the United States do not 
favor sons over daughters; indeed, if marriage market as well as labor 
market returns are incorporated into the analysis, the empirical evi 
dence suggests that parents' preferences give slightly more weight to 
daughters than to sons. These results contrast with the finding that 
there is unequal concern favoring sons in the lean season in rural India.
Birth-order effects have been widely discussed in the biological, 
psychological, and popular literatures. Lower birth-order children (i.e., 
older children) may benefit from developing in more adult-oriented 
environments and from teaching their younger siblings. Higher birth- 
order children, on the other hand, may benefit from having more expe 
rienced parents. Casual observation (perhaps primarily by older sib-
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lings) suggests that the youngest child is often spoiled by excessive 
parental attention and indulgence. Finally, birth order may be related to 
health because of the relationship between birth order and mother's 
age, with less healthy children borne by very young and very old moth 
ers.
Birth order may affect intrafamily allocation through preferences or 
through constraints. On the preference side, parents may fail to exhibit 
equal concern and instead favor the eldest or youngest child. On the 
constraint side, parents with many children may allocate less to each 
child, and borrowing constraints may vary over the parents' life cycle, 
differentially affecting children of different birth orders. Estimates of 
the SET model find that intrafamily allocations favor children of lower 
birth order both for the United States and for rural Indian in the lean 
season. For the United States, borrowing constraints are part of the 
explanation.
Second, an implication of the wealth model with high resources 
given to children and equal concern is that differences in income 
yielded by transfers of financial and physical assets given to children 
offset differences in labor market earnings of children in the same fam 
ily. The data, however, show that for most households the absolute 
magnitudes of gifts and bequests are insufficient to offset fully earn 
ings differentials among siblings (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
1995; Menchik 1979, 1980, 1988; Wilhelm 1991). Moreover, the dom 
inant pattern for bequests—equal or almost equal bequests for all chil 
dren in the same family—is not consistent with bequests offsetting 
earnings differentials among children in the same family. Differences 
in inter vivos transfers to children do compensate a little for differences 
in their earnings, but offset very little of these differences. Finally, for 
families for which the resources devoted to children are not sufficient 
that all children receive transfers, the wealth model still implies that 
one child may receive transfers. But available data on bequests indi 
cates that it is rare that one but only one child receives bequests. Thus, 
all in all, the data on transfers to children, though fragmentary, does not 
provide much support for the wealth model. They are consistent, how 
ever, with the SET model.
Third, there are recent estimates, based on minimal assumptions, of 
whether intrahousehold allocations of schooling investments are in 
response to endowments and, if so, whether they reinforce endowment
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differentials or compensate for endowment differentials among sib 
lings. These estimates utilize data on adult identical and, in some cases, 
fraternal twins. 3 The essence of the procedures used to obtain these 
estimates is now illustrated with reference to the following relations.
Assume that earnings of the ith child (Ej) in a family depends lin 
early on that child's schooling (S,), an unobserved family earnings 
endowment that is common to all children in the family (f), an unob 
served child-specific endowment that distinguishes that child from the 
common family endowment (a^, and a random error term (e,) due to 
measurement error in earnings. Then for two children in a family, the 
earnings relations are:4
(1) E^bSj+f+a^e, 
and
(2) E2 = b S 2 + f + a 2 + e2
where b is the true impact of schooling. Assume further that there are 
linear schooling allocation rules that indicate how parents allocate 
schooling to two children depending on the unobserved endowments of 
each (a b a2), some common family characteristics including parental 
wealth and education and the common family endowments (X), and 
random disturbance terms (u, and u2, respectively):
(3) S! = a, a, + oc2 a2 + pX + u, 
and
(4) S2 = a, a2 + oc2 a, + PX + u2
where a, is the parental schooling allocation response to the endow 
ment of the child being invested in a2 is the parental schooling alloca 
tion response to the endowment of the other child, and p is the parental 
schooling allocation response common family characteristics. If a l is 
positive and (X2 is negative, parents reinforce endowment differentials 
by investing more in the schooling of the child with greater endow 
ments, thus increasing the inequality of the distribution of earnings. If
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(X] is negative and a2 is positive, parents compensate for endowment 
differentials by investing more in the schooling of the child with lesser 
endowments, thus reducing inequality in the distribution of earnings.
The critical parameters in neither the earnings relations nor the 
schooling allocation relations can be estimated consistently with data 
on individuals or even on siblings. To see why, consider what happens 
if one tries to estimate the schooling effect on earnings (i.e., the param 
eter b) from relation (1) and observations on schooling and earnings 
for a number of individuals. The problem is that the schooling alloca 
tion rule in relation (3) means that schooling is correlated with family 
(f, which is in X) and individual-specific endowments (a]). Those who 
are more schooled are likely to have greater endowments, so the usual 
procedure of simply associating individual earnings with individual 
schooling does not indicate the effect of schooling alone on earnings.
Figure 4 illustrates this problem. The solid line gives the true rela 
tion between earnings and schooling, with a slope b. For individuals, 
however, data observations in general are not on this true line because 
of the random disturbance term (e,) and because of the unobserved 
endowments (f + a,). The random disturbance term takes on values that 
are independent of schooling, so it does not cause the estimated slope 
of the line to shift. However, if those with more ability tend to have 
more schooling, the unobserved endowments are likely to be larger for 
those with more schooling. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of endow 
ments that deviate positively from the average at high schooling levels 
and negatively from the average at low schooling levels (with y reflect 
ing the relation of the unobserved endowments with schooling) and 
how they twist the estimated earnings-schooling relation if they are not 
controlled in the estimation. If there is not control for such unobserved 
endowments, what is estimated by looking at the association between 
earnings and schooling is not the slope of the true relation, but the 
slope of the dashed line, which reflects in part the effects of the endow 
ments in addition to the effects of schooling. Thus, the usual procedure 
of associating schooling with earnings without control for endowments 
might overstate substantially the impact of schooling on earnings and 
other outcomes.
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Figure 4. True and Estimated Impact of Schooling on Earnings If 
Schooling Allocated in Response to Endowments
Earnings estimated 
relation
true 
relation
Schooling
How might endowments be controlled in order to obtain better esti 
mates of the impact of schooling on earnings? One possibility would 
be to follow the lead of the experimental sciences and randomly assign 
schooling rather than letting families decide on schooling. This would 
eliminate the estimation problem caused by schooling being allocated 
in response to endowments, but in most societies would be very diffi 
cult to do. A second possibility is to control for endowments using 
proxies such as IQ test scores. If endowments can be controlled com 
pletely through such observed measures, a consistent estimate of the 
true schooling effects can be obtained. But it is not clear that it is possi 
ble to measure all aspects of endowments. Moreover, some of the 
observed indicators that have been proposed to be used to control for 
endowments, such as IQ scores, may represent not only endowments 
but also dimensions of behavior including treatment at home and 
schooling.
A third possibility is to use data on identical twins to estimate the 
difference between relations (1) and (2):
(5) E, -E2 = b (S, -S2) + (f-F) + (a, -a2) + (e, -e2).
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The effects of the family components of endowments disappear in such 
a relation. For identical twins (and only for identical twins) there are 
only common endowments (not individual-specific endowments), so 
estimation of relation (5) eliminates biases due to endowments. 5 Early 
estimates using this procedure indicate that the true impact of school 
ing on earnings is only about a third as large suggested by associations 
that do not control for endowments (Behrman and Taubman 1976; 
Behrman, Hrubec, Taubman, and Wales 1980).
But this procedure exacerbates another possible estimation problem 
noted earlier with regard to intergenerational correlations: measure 
ment error. Random measurement error in a right-side variable in a 
relation such as (1) causes the coefficient estimate of that variable to be 
biased toward zero. If the schooling measure used is noisy due to mea 
surement error, in other words, the true impact of schooling on earn 
ings is partially disguised and underestimated. Differencing between 
two schooling measures as in relation (5) if each is contaminated by 
noise exacerbates the bias towards zero due to measurement error. A 
series of recent studies has applied the twins estimator in relation (5) 
with control for measurement error (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; 
Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 1994, 1996). These studies all 
find that control for measurement error reduces the apparent biases in 
the standard studies due to failure to control for unobserved endow 
ments. But for four of the five twins samples used, the estimates still 
indicate that there are significant upward biases in the standard esti 
mates of the impact of schooling on earnings because of the failure to 
control for endowments. For some of the U.S. samples, moreover, the 
proportion of the variance in earnings due to such endowments is con 
siderable: 27 percent of the total for men and 7 percent of the total for 
women due in individual-specific endowment variations within fami 
lies (plus another 16 percent for women due to variability in family 
endowments) in the studies in Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 
(1994, 1996).
Most of these studies, thus, imply that intrahousehold allocations of 
schooling are in response to endowments. But estimation of relation 
(5) alone with identical twins cannot indicate whether, if endowments 
differ among children, such allocations reinforce or compensate for 
such differences. Two of these recent twins studies (Behrman, Rosenz 
weig and Taubman 1994, 1996), however, develop a procedure for esti-
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mating whether there is reinforcement or compensation in the 
schooling allocation rules by using both identical and fraternal twins 
and by estimating together with relation (5) the difference in the school 
allocations rules (obtained by subtracting relation (4) from relation (3):
(6) S, - S2 = ((*! - oc2) (a, - a2) + (u, - u2).
Intuitively, their procedure is equivalent to obtaining a consistent 
estimate of the parameter b from estimating relation (5) with identical 
twins, using this parameter to obtain an estimate of (a! - a2) by estimat 
ing relation (5) for fraternal twins, and then using this estimate of (a, - 
a2) to estimate relation (6) for fraternal twins and thus obtain an esti 
mate of ((Xj - oc2). If the estimate of (o^ - (X2) is positive, parents invest 
in schooling of their children so as to reinforce endowment differen 
tials and increase income inequalities (and vice versa if (o^ - oc2) is 
negative). The estimates indicate that there is parental reinforcement in 
that children with greater endowments have greater schooling and 
more resource-intensive (higher quality) schooling. For men, for exam 
ple, these estimates imply that positive reinforcement of endowments 
by intrahousehold allocations increases by about 80 percent absolute 
earnings differentials that emanate from preschool individual-specific 
endowment differentials.
Conclusions
Family background may play an important role in determining the 
distribution of income and who is rich and who is poor. Estimates of 
intergenerational correlations and of heritability are consistent with a 
major role of family background in determining individuals' economic 
success. With control for measurement error in earnings, the U.S. inter- 
generational experience seems characterized by many more individuals 
born into a "culture of poverty" or "with a silver spoon in their 
mouths" than by Horatio Alger "rags to riches" (or reverse Horatio 
Alger "riches to rags") stories. But it is important to remember that 
correlation or heritability descriptions of limited intergenerational 
mobility in themselves do not provide direct information about the
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effectiveness of schooling and other means for affecting economic out 
comes. Though this point is often misunderstood, even if heritability 
estimates are high, schooling and other measures may be quite effec 
tive in altering economic outcomes.
The high association for economic outcomes across generations, 
nevertheless, suggests that what happens within households may have 
important implications for children's economic alternatives. Models 
have been developed of intrahousehold allocations of schooling and 
other human resource investments among children in the presence of 
unobserved (by social scientists but observed by the parents) heteroge- 
nous endowments of the children. The predominant model of intra 
household allocations, the wealth model, suggests that parents with 
equal concern who allocate enough resources to their children will (a) 
invest in the schooling of their children at socially efficient levels if 
there are not market imperfections, and (b) provide transfers of assets 
the income from which will offset earnings differentials among their 
children. An alternative, the Separable Earnings Transfer (SET) model, 
(a) suggests that even with no market imperfections parents will not 
necessarily invest in the schooling of their children at socially optimal 
levels, and (b) posits that the pattern of earnings among these children 
(resulting from their endowments and schooling) is not related to the 
pattern of parental resource transfers among these children.
Empirical exploration of these intrahousehold models and their 
implications is difficult because of data limitations both regarding child 
endowments and regarding the lifetime economic interactions between 
children and their parents. But progress has been made with special 
data, such as data on adult siblings including twins, their economic sta 
tus, and their economic interactions with their parents. Empirical 
explorations to date suggest some tentative conclusions. Transfers to 
children do not compensate for earnings differentials as posited in the 
wealth model with equal concern and sufficient parental resources 
devoted to children, so earnings differentials induced by intrahouse 
hold allocations among children of schooling carry over to total 
income differentials. Parental allocations of human resources among 
their children in the United States tend to reflect some concern about 
distribution among the children rather than just maximizing total 
income of the children, with some unequal concern favoring those of 
lower birth order (though not according to gender). In contrast, in the
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much poorer society of rural India, there is much less concern about 
distribution and there is unequal concern favoring sons when resources 
are tightest (as well as unequal concern favoring low birth order chil 
dren). But still, in the United States, parents on net reinforce endow 
ment differentials by investing more in the schooling of better- 
endowed children in a manner that almost doubles the impact of 
within-family endowment differentials on earnings. Thus, endowment 
differentials among children in the same families and intrahousehold 
allocations in response to such endowments play an important role in 
increasing earnings and income inequalities in the United States; the 
within-family endowment differentials alone account for a quarter of 
the variation of In earnings for males, which is reinforced by schooling 
allocations to account for over two-fifths of the total variation in earn 
ings. The importance of unobserved endowments in intrahousehold 
allocations, finally, reinforces the importance of considering what 
determines schooling in attempts to evaluate the impact of schooling 
on economic and other outcomes in order to attain estimates of the 
effects of schooling per se that are not contaminated by effects of 
unobserved abilities, motivations, and family connections.
NOTES
The author has benefited in preparing this paper from collaborative work with a number of 
individuals through the years, but particularly from work with Robert A Pollak, Mark R. Rosenz- 
weig, and Paul Taubman The author also thanks Jon R. Neill and two reviewers from the Upjohn 
Institute for editonal suggestions that have improved the presentation
1 It can be shown that hentabihty as defined above is equal to twice the difference in the cor 
relation for identical versus fraternal twins
2 In these two models, parents make the active decision and the children are passive In other 
models, the children may attempt to actively manipulate the outcomes to their advantage (e g , 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985, Pollak 1988) Parents also may have unified objectives or 
may bargain over various allocations (see survey in Behrman 1995) For simplicity, I limit my 
attention here to models with passive children and with parents who have unified objectives
3 Some might question whether families with twins are so different from other families that 
one cannot learn much of general value from studying families with twins. But the procedures that 
are used to study within-family allocations to twins effectively control for the family effects (f and 
X below) that might reflect differences in families that have twins from other families
4. I limit this presentation to the two-child family for simplicity, but the basic points hold if 
there are more children in the family
5. For any siblings, not just identical twins, the common family component is controlled with 
such estimates It might appear that it is better to control for that common component with sibling 
data than to use individual data But that is not necessarily true The bias may be greater with sib 
ling estimates due to the difference in individual-specific endowments than in individual estimates 
(Gnhches 1979)
References
Ashenfelter, Orley, and Alan Krueger. 1994. "Estimates of the Economic 
Return to Schooling from a New Sample of Twins," American Economic 
Review 84, 5 (December): 1157-1174.
Becker, Gary S. 1967. "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of 
Income: An Analytical Approach." Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 
Woytinsky Lecture, (reprinted in Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Second 
Edition, Columbia University Press, 1975).
____. 1991, A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. 1976. "Child Endowments and the Quan 
tity and Quality of Children," Journal of Political Economy 84, 4, Part 2 
(August): S143-S162.
____. 1979. "An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Incomes and 
Intergenerational Mobility," Journal of Political Economy 87, 6 (Decem 
ber): 1153-1189.
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. 1986. "Human Capital and the Rise and 
Fall of Families," Journal of Labor Economics 4, 3, Part II (July): S1-S39.
Behrman, Jere R. 1988a. "Intrahousehold Allocation of Nutrients in Rural 
India: Are Boys Favored? Do Parents Exhibit Inequality Aversion?" Oxford 
Economic Papers 40, 1 (March): 32-54.
____. 1988b. "Nutrition, Health, Birth Order, and Seasonality: Intrahouse 
hold Allocation in Rural India," Journal of Development Economics 28, 7 
(February): 43-63.
____. 1996. "Intrahousehold Distribution and the Family." In Handbook of
Population and Family Economics, Mark R. Rosenzweig and Oded Stark, 
eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Behrman, Jere R., Z. Hrubec, Paul Taubman, and Terence J. Wales. 1980. 
Socioeconomic Success: A Study of the Effects of Genetic Endowments, 
Family Environment and Schooling. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Behrman, Jere R., Robert A. Pollak, and Paul Taubman. 1982. "Parental Pref 
erences and Provision for Progeny," Journal of Political Economy 90, 1 
(February): 52-73.
____. 1986. "Do Parents Favor Boys?" International Economic Review 27, 
1 (February): 31-52.
____. 1995. "The Wealth Model: Efficiency in Education and Equity in the
Family," In From Parent to Child: Intrahousehold Allocations and Inter- 
generational Relations in the United States, Jere R. Behrman, Robert A. 
Pollak, and Paul Taubman, eds. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
124
Poverty and Inequality 125
Behrman, Jere R., Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Paul Taubman. 1994. "Endow 
ments and the Allocation of Schooling in the Family and in the Marriage 
Market: The Twins Experiment," Journal of Political Economy 102, 6 
(December)" 1131-1174.
_____. 1996. "College Choice and Wages: Estimates Using Data on Female 
Twins," Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 4 (November): 672-685.
Behrman, Jere R., and Paul Taubman. 1976. "Intergenerational Transmission 
of Income and Wealth," American Economic Review 66, 3 (May): 436:440.
____. 1985. "Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the U.S.: Some Esti 
mates and a Test of Becker's Intergenerational Endowments Model," 
Review of Economics and Statistics 67, 1 (February): 144-151.
____. 1986. "Birth Order, Schooling, and Earnings," Journal of Labor Eco 
nomics 4, 3 (July): S121-S145. 
__. 1989. "Is Schooling 'Mostly in the Genes'? Nature-Nurture Decom 
position with Data on Relatives," Journal of Political Economy 97, 6 
(December): 1425-1446. 
__. 1990. "Intergenerational Correlation between Children's Adult Earn 
ings and Their Parents' Income: Results from the Michigan Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics," The Review of Income and Wealth 36, 2 (June): 115-
127. 
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1985.
"The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Political Economy 93, 6
(December): 1045-1076. 
Griliches, Zvi. 1979. "Sibling Models and Data in Economics: Beginnings of
a Survey," Journal of Political Economy 87, 5, Part 2 (October): S37-S64. 
Herrnstein, Richard J., and Charles Murray. 1994. The Bell Curve: Intelli 
gence and Class Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press. 
Menchik, Paul. 1979. "Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality: An
Empirical Study of Wealth Mobility," Economica, 46, 184 (November):
349-362. 
____. 1980. "Primogeniture, Equal Sharing and the U.S. Distribution of
Wealth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 2 (March): 299-316. 
______. 1988. "Unequal Estate Division: Is It Altruism, Reverse Bequest or
Simply Noise?" In Modelling the Accumulation and Distribution of Wealth,
Denis Kessler and Andre Masson, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pollak, Robert A. 1988. "Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences," Araer-
ican Economic Review 78, 2 (May): 240-244. 
Solon, Gary. 1989. "Biases in the Estimation of Intergenerational Earnings
Correlations," Review of Economics and Statistics 71, 1 (February): 172-
174.
126 From Parent to Child
____. 1992. "Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States," 
American Economic Review 82, 3 (June): 393-408.
Wilhelm, Mark O. 1991. "Bequests Behavior and the Effect of Heir's Earn 
ings: Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests." Mimeo, Pennsylvania State 
University.
Zimmerman, David J. 1992. "Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic 
Stature," American Economic Review 82, 3 (June): 409-429.
